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Abstract Recently Erik Scerri has published an influential philosophical history of
the development of the Periodic Table. Following Scerri’s account, I will explore
the main thread of the arguments responsible for the remarkable advancement of
scientific understanding that the Periodic Table represents. I will argue that the
history of disputation at crucial junctures in the debate shows sensitivity to the
aspects of truth that are captured by my model of truth in inquiry. The availability of
a clear and explicit model of truth in inquiry is of crucial importance as a response
to post-modernist and other relativistic accounts of inquiry. It shows that despite
such apparent sociological constraints as acceptability a robust theory of truth is
available as a foundation for evaluating argumentation.
Keywords
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1 Preliminaries
For over a decade I have been presenting papers that include a theory of emerging
truth that I feel is a contribution towards understanding the relation of substantive
arguments to their evaluation (Weinstein 1999, 2002, 2006a, b, 2007a, b, 2009).
Substantive arguments address crucial issues of concern and so, invariably in the
modern context, rely on the fruits of inquiry for their substance. This raises deep
epistemological issues; for inquiry is ultimately evaluated on its epistemological
adequacy and basic epistemological concepts are none to easy to exemplify in the
musings of human beings. The traditional poles are knowledge and belief; in modern
argumentation theory this is reflected in the distinction between acceptance and
truth (Johnson, 2000). Crudely put, the rhetorical concern of acceptance is contrasted
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to the logical concern for truth with acceptability being a bridge between them in
much of informal logic and argumentation theory.
It seems to me that the legacy of formal logic, embedded without much notice, in
much of informal logic and argumentation theory creates a problem for an account
of the logic of substantive inquiry and a muscular identification of acceptability with
truth. The root problem is the model of argument as premise conclusion relations
and argumentation seen as a series of such. In a recursive model, so natural in
formal systems, evaluation works from the bottom up, in the standard case, by
assigning truth to propositions. But ascertaining the truth of elements, except in
relatively trivial circumstances, points away from the particulars and towards the
context. This is particularly true of inquiry, and so is essentially true of substantive
arguments that rely on the fruits of inquiry. For if we take the best of the fruits of
inquiry available we find that truth of elements, although frequently a pressing local
issue, is rarely the issue that ultimately drives the inquiry. Truth of elements is
superseded by what one might call, network concerns. And it is upon network
relations that an adequate notion of truth in inquiry can be constructed. My ultimate
goal is to defend a model of emerging truth as a bridge between acceptability and
truth. That is, to indicate a logical structure for acceptability that, at the limit, is as
true as we can ever hope for. In this paper I want to show that the model of
emerging truth captures the large structure of the inquiry that supports the
acceptance of the Periodic Table, about as true a thing as we can expect.
My model of emerging truth (abbreviated in the Appendix) relies on three
intuitive network principles, concilience that is the increasing adequacy of empirical
description over time, breadth, the scope of a set of theoretic constructs in
application to a range of empirical descriptions and depth, a measure of levels of
theoretic redefinitions each one of which results in increasing breadth and higher
levels of concilience.
A theory of truth that relies on the satisfaction of these three constraints creates
immediate problems if we are to accept standard logical relations. The most
pressing within inquiry is the relation of a generalization and its consequences to
counter examples. Without going into detail here, the model of truth supports a
principled description of the relation of counter-examples to warranted claims that
permits a comparative evaluation to be made rather than a forced rejection of one or
the other as in the standard account (Appendix, Part II). Such a radical departure
from standard logic requires strong support and although my theory of truth offers a
theoretic framework, without a clear empirical model my views are easily
overlooked as fanciful.

2 Why the Periodic Table?
If you ask any sane relatively well-educated person what the world is really made
of, the response is likely to be something about atoms for molecules. Why is this so?
Why is the prevailing ontology of the age based on modern physical science? What
prompted this ontological revision away from ordinary objects as primary and to the
exclusion of the host of alternative culturally embedded views especially those
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supported by religion and a variety of traditional explanatory frameworks, whether
lumped together as folklore or more positively as common sense? The obvious
explanation is the growing conviction that science yields truth.
There is no doubt that the shift is a result of the amazing practical advances of the
last few centuries, the entire range of scientific marvels put at our disposal, from
cyclotrons, to computers, from the amazing results of material science and the
creation of synthetics to the understanding of the very stuff of genetic coding in the
cell. It seem equally obvious to me that the one object that anchors this enormous
array of understanding and accomplishment is the Periodic Table of Elements.
The concern for truth that disputation reflected as the Periodic Table advanced
dialectically in light of changing evidence and competing theoretic visions mirrors
the three main considerations that form the standard accounts of truth in the
philosophical literature. The over-arching consideration is the immediate pragmatic
advantage in terms of the goals of inquiry, that is an increasing empirical adequacy
and the depth of cogency of theoretic understanding. These pragmatic considerations, along with practical effectiveness in relation to applications of inquiry in
engineering and other scientific endeavors, point to the major epistemological
considerations that practical success reflects, that is, higher conformity to
expectations, empirical adequacy, the basic metaphor for correspondence in the
standard theory of truth, and increasing inferential adequacy and computational
accuracy, coherence in the standard account. The relation between these and my
trio, concilience, breadth and depth, can only be hinted at in the abbreviated version.
Roughly, each of my three contributes in a different way to the standard three. But I
hold my account liable to these standard desiderata as well as to the demand of
descriptive adequacy. So if my theory of truth in inquiry is adequate, it must be
proved against the Periodic Table.
My original conviction was based on a rather informal reading of Chemistry and
its history. Despite the relative superficiality of my engagement, it seemed apparent
that the salient aspects of truth that my model identified were readily seen within the
history of chemical advancement and its gradual uncovering of the keystone around
which the explanatory framework of physical science was to be built. It was not
until recently that I was able to test my intuition against an available and expert
account of the development of the Periodic Table. Such an account now exists in the
thoughtful and well-researched philosophical history of the table by philosopher and
historian of chemistry Erik Scerri, (2007). I rely heavily on his account for specifics.
But first, a brief comment about arguments. It seems safe to say that for
scientifically oriented argumentation theorists exploring the literature still available
in actual records of argumentation among the chemists involved would be
fascinating. Eavesdropping on their discussions would even be more fascinating for
those who see the study of argumentation as involving rhetorical details and actual
argumentative exchanges between interlocutors. Such an approach is natural within
conceptions of argument seen as debates and dialogue games. But in inquiry, so it
seems to me, the perspective needs to be broader than ‘persuasion dialogues.’ An
alternative looks at argumentation in the large, that is, seeing how the dispute
evolves around the key poles that drive the actual developing positions in response
to the activities, both verbal and material, of the discussants. Such a perspective in
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the theory of argument permits a more logical turn, exposing the shifting
epistemological structure that undergirds the dialogue in so far as it is reasonable.
It enables the epistemological core to be seen. For in this larger sense the rationality
of the enterprise can be seen not merely in terms of individuals and their beliefs, but
in the gradual exposure of the warrants underlying the points at issue. In what
follows I will indicate the participants as points of reference for those who might
want to see to what extent the actual dialogues among chemists reflect the
epistemological warrants. Scerri in his marvelous and detailed account presents the
details of the competing positions and their shifts as the evidence and theories
change. My purpose here is to identify the large epistemological structures that, in
so far as I am correct, ultimately warrant the present consensus.

3 The Periodic Table
The first realization that sets the stage for a renegotiation of the theory of truth is
that there is no clear candidate for what the Periodic Table of Elements is. That is
not to say that the choices are random or wide spread, but rather that even after
more than a century, the debate as to the most adequate format for the Periodic
Table of Elements is ongoing (among other things, the placement of the rare
earths remains a point of contention, pp. 21–24). For now and for the foreseeable
future both the organization and details of the Periodic Table are open to revision
in light of the ends for which it is constructed. To account for this we require
some details.
The work of John Dalton at the beginning of the nineteenth century is a
convenient starting place for the discussion of the Periodic Table since he postulated
that ‘the weights of atoms would serve as a kind of bridge between the realm of
microscopic unobservable atoms and the world of observable properties’ (p. 34).
This was no purely metaphysical position, but rather reflected the revolution in
chemistry that included two key ideas. Lavoisier took weighing residual elements
after chemical decomposition as the primary source of data and Dalton maintained
that such decomposition resulted in identifiable atoms. This was Dalton’s
reconstitution of the ancient idea of elements, now transformed from ordinary
substances to elements that were the result of chemical decomposition. Studies of a
range of gases, by 1805, yielded a table of atomic and molecular weights that
supported the ‘long recognized law of constant proportions…when any two
elements combine together, for example, hydrogen and oxygen, they always do so
in a constant ratio of their masses (pp. 35–36). Scerri epitomizes this period, begun
as early as the last decade of the eighteenth century by Benjamin Richter who
published a table of equivalent weights, as that of finding meaningful quantitative
relationships among the elements. A period that yielded both the possibility of
precision and opened theoretic descriptions to all of the vagaries of empirical
measurements: open to the full problematic of weakly supported theories, new and
developing procedures of measurement, and the complex nature of the measurement
process itself, measures that were open to change and refinement as techniques were
improved and experimenters gained more experience.
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In hindsight many the problems that confronted the chemists reflected a
conceptual issue expressed in empirical incongruities: atomic weight is not
invariably reflected in equivalent weight and so the underlying structure was not
readily ascertained by finding equivalent weights, the core empirical tool. For
without knowing the correct chemical formula, there is no way to coordinate the
correct proportions against the observed measurements of the weight of component
elements in ordinary occurring chemical compounds. And as it turns out, ‘‘the
question of finding the right formula for compounds was only conclusively resolved
a good deal later when the concept of valency, the combining power of particular
elements was clarified by chemists in the decade that followed by Edward Frankland
and Auguste Kekule working separately’ (p. 37).
The initial problems, including Dalton’s infamous mistaken formula for water,
were the result of empirical incongruities seen in light of a core integrating
hypothesis: the law of definite proportion by volume, expressed in 1809 by Guy
Lusac as: ‘The volume of gases entering into a chemical reaction and the gaseous
products are in a ratio of small integers’ (p. 37). Held as almost a regulative
principle the law was confronted with countless counterexamples, recalcitrant, yet
often roughly accurate, measurements the reflected the lack of knowledge of the
time. A common occurrence throughout the history of science, early chemistry
reflects the competing pull of empirical adequacy and theoretic clarity. Not one to
the exclusion of the other, but both in an uneasy balance. This reflected many
disputes but the one that reflects the deepest thread that runs through the history of
the Table is Prout’s Hypothesis. Scerri identifies the key insight: the rather
remarkable fact that ‘many of the equivalent weights and atomic weights appeared
to be approximately whole number multiples of the weights of hydrogen’ (p. 38).
This was based on the increasing numbers of tables of atomic weights available in
the first decades of the nineteenth century. But it was not merely increasing data that
drove the science. The two poles, not surprisingly, were the attempts to offer
empirically adequate descriptions that demonstrate sufficient structural integrity in
light of underlying theoretic assumptions exemplified in the law of definite
proportions. Prout’s hypothesis, that elements are composed of hydrogen, first
indicated in an anonymous publication in 1819 offered a deeply unifying insight, if
everything was composed of one element the law of definite proportions was an
immediate corollary. The bold hypothesis was based on ‘rounding off’ empirical
values of the of the comparative weights of elements as an index of the atomic
weights, to whole number multiples of 1, the presumed atomic weight of hydrogen.
Available data created roadblocks. In 1825, the noted chemist Jacob Berzelius
‘compiled a set of improved atomic weights the disproved Prout’s hypothesis (p.
40). Prout’s hypothesis, however, whatever its empirical difficulties ‘proved to be
very fruitful because it encouraged the determination of accurate atomic weights by
numerous chemists who were trying to either confirm or refute it’ (p. 42).
But there was more to the story. Quantitative relationships have an essential yield
beyond the increased ability to offer precise descriptions that may be subjected to
increasingly stringent empirical testing. That is, they open themselves to structural
interpretations. Available data quickly afforded systematization as a prelude to
eventual theoretic adequacy. The first effort to systematize known empirical results
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can be attributed to the German chemist Johann Dobreiner who in 1817 constructed
triples of elements which showed chemical similarities and most essentially showed
‘an important numerical relationship, namely, that the equivalent weight, or atomic
weight ‘of the middle is the approximate mean of the values of the two flanking
elements in the triad’ (p. 42). This moved the focus from constructing tables of
atomic weights to looking more closely at the relationships among known values. It
led to an initial structural unification of the table of elements through the
identification of more triads, triples of elements that show clear ratios between their
equivalent weights and therefore their presumed atomic weights. Other chemists,
notably Max Pettenkofer and Peter Kremers, worked with similar constructions,
which culminated in Ernst Lensser fitting all 58 known elements into a structure of
20 triads. But the problem of ascertaining atomic weights still resulted in competing
values and contrasting constructions. By 1843 a precursor to the periodic table was
published by Leopold Gmelin, a system that combined some 53 elements in an array
that reflected the chemical and mathematical properties, accurately organizing most
known elements in groups that would later be reflected in the underlying principles
of the periodic table.
Scerri concludes. ‘It is rather surprising that both Prout’s hypothesis and the
notion of triads are essentially correct and appeared problematic only because the
early researchers were working with the wrong data’ (p. 61). Prout is, of course,
correct in seeing hydrogen as the basis the elements, since hydrogen with one proton
serves as the basis as we move across the Periodic Table, each element adding
protons in whole number ratios based on hydrogen with one proton. The number of
protons yielding the final organizational principle of the table, once atomic number,
distinguished from atomic weight which includes the contribution from neutrons
unknown until the mid-twentieth century. And similarly for earlier structural models
based on triads. It was only after the famous hypothesis of Amadeo Avogadro of
1811 was championed by Stanislao Cannizzaro in the midcentury that chemists had
a firm enough footing to develop increasingly adequate measurements of atomic
weight and began to see the shape of the underlying relationships.
The increase in triads is an example of the most basic of the requirements for
sustaining a generalization against counterexamples. The empirical evidence, its
models, form a model chain, technically, there is a function that maps the hypothesis
onto a set of models (or near models) and the model chain is progressive, that is, the
set of models in increasing over time (Appendix, Part I, 1.1). The dialectical force of
counterexamples, rather than requiring rejection of either pair requires an
adjudication of the power of the counterexample against the weight of the model
chain that it confutes. That is not to reject the counterexample, rather to moderate its
dialectical force (Appendix, Part II). This requires a number of assumptions about
the models. The first is the assumption that models can be ordered, and the second
that approximation relationships can be defined that support the ordering. The latter
is crucial, approximation relations (technically neighborhood relations on a field of
sets) enable complex relationships among evidence of all sorts to be defined.
Intuitively, approximation relations are afforded indices of the goodness of fit
between the evidence and the model in respect to the terms and relationships
expressed in a generalization. This has a deep affinity to the notion of acceptability
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in argument theory, since how narrowly the acceptable approximations need to be is
determined a posteriori in light of the practice in the field. This is subject to debate
but is no mere sociological construct, since there is an additional requirement. The
model chain must prove to be progressive, that is the chain of models must be
increasing and be an increasingly better approximations over time (Appendix, Part I,
1.2).
This is evident in the history of the Periodic Table. By the 1860s the discovery of
triads had moved further into the beginnings of the periodic system. By the 1880s a
number of individuals could be credited with beginning a systematization of the
elements. Scerri, in addition to Dimitri Mendeleev and Julius Lothar Meyer, credits
Alexendre De Chancourtois and John Newlands, William Odling and Gustavus
Hinrichs.
Systematization was made possible by the improved methods for determining
atomic weights by, among others, Stanislao Cannizzaro and a clear distinction
between molecular and atomic weight. As Scerri puts it ‘the relative weight of the
known elements could be compare in a reliable manner, although a number of these
values were still incorrect and would be corrected only by the discovery of the
periodic system’ (p. 67). Systematization was supported by the discovery of a
number of new elements that fit within the preliminary organizing structures and the
focus was moved towards experimental outcomes without much concern for the
theoretic pressure of Prout’s hypothesis which fell out of favor as an organizing
principle as the idea of simple arithmetic relationships among the elements proved
harder to sustain in the light of growing body of empirical evidence.
From the point of view of my construction what was persuasive was the
availability of model chains that in and of themselves were progressive (Appendix,
Part I, 1.3). That is, series of models could be connected though approximation
relations despite the lack of an underlying and unifying hypotheses. And whatever
the details of goodness of fit, the structure itself took precedence over both deep
theory (Prout’s hypothesis) in the name of network of models connected by
reasonably clear if evolving, quantitative and chemical relationships.
The hasty rejection of Prout’s hypothesis at this juncture, despite its role as
encapsulating the fundamental intuition behind the search of quantitative relationships, offers a window into what a theory of emerging truth requires. In the standard
model of, for example, Karl Popper, counterexamples force the rejection of the
underlying hypothesis. But as often, the counterexample is accepted, but the
hypothesis persists, continuing as the basis for the search for theoretic relationships.
The intuition that prompted the search for a unifying structure in terms of which the
mathematical and chemical properties of the elements could be organized and
displayed was sustained in the light of countervailing empirical evidence. Making
sense of this requires a more flexible logic, one that permits of a temporary focus on
a subset of the properties and relations within of a model while sustaining the set of
models deemed adequate in the larger sense exhibited by the connections among
models in a unifying theoretical structure. And as the century progressed the search
for such a structure began to bear fruit.
By the turn of the century the core intuition, combining chemical affinities and
mathematical measurements resulted in a number of proposals that pointed towards
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the Periodic Table. John Newland introduced the idea of structural level with his
‘law of octaves’, the geologist, Alexander De Chancourtois, and chemists William
Odling and Gustavus Hinrichs offered structural accounts of know elements. All this
culminated in the work of Lothar Meyer and most famously Dimitri Mendeleev who
are credited as the key progenitors of the periodic table. The proliferation of
structured arrays of models reflected the key epistemic property I call ‘model chain
progressive’ (Appendix, Part I, 1.3). That is, model chains were themselves being
linked in an expanding array such that the set of model chains was itself increasing
both in number and in empirical adequacy. The culmination was a series of
publications by Mendeleev beginning in 1869, which codified and refined the
Periodic Table in various editions of his textbook, The Principles of Chemistry,
which by 1891 was available in French, German and English.
Mendeleev encapsulated his findings in eight points:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.
8.

The elements if arranged according to their atomic weights, exhibit periodicity
of properties.
Elements which are similar as regards their chemical properties have atomic
weights, which are either of nearly the same values…
The arrangements of the elements, or of groups of elements, the order of their
atomic weights corresponds to their so-called valences…
The elements which are most widely diffused have small atomic weights.
The magnitude of the atomic weight determines the character of the elements,
just as the magnitude of the molecule determines the character of the compound
body.
We must expect the discovery of many yet unknown elements, for example
elements analogous to aluminium and silicon whose weights should be between
65 and 71.
The atomic weight of an element may be sometimes be amended by a
knowledge of those contiguous elements…
Certain characteristic properties of the elements can be foretold from their
atomic weights’ (all italics original, pp. 109–110).

As is well known Mendeleev’s conjectures led to a number of compelling
predications of unknown elements based on gaps in the table (item 6). This is
generally thought to be the most significant factor in its acceptance. Scerri
maintains, and I concur, that of equal importance was the accommodations to
accepted data that the system afforded (item 7). A major contribution is the
correction of atomic weights due to the realization of the importance of valence
(item 3). Atomic weight was not identical with equivalent weight only but rather
reflected the product of equivalent weight and valence (p. 126). This was reflected
by the increase in accuracy as the power of the notion of period in guiding
subsequent empirical research proved invaluable (item 1) as well as in the emerging
connections between chemical and mathematical properties (items 2, 5 and 8). Even
more important to the development of physical chemistry was the effect of the
system on later developments in the microphysics, which developed, in part, as an
explanatory platform upon which the table could stand. These are all powerful
considerations in accounting for the general acceptance of the periodic table in the
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twentieth century. The last of these, indicated almost in passing in item 4, points us
back to the ultimate reinterpretation and vindication of Prout’s hypotheses. For it is
hydrogen with an atomic weight of 1.00794 that that moves us to the next stage in
my model, the role of reduction as the harbinger of truth in science.
Beginning with the discovery of the electron by J.J. Thompson in 1897, the early
decades of the twentieth century showed enormous progress in the elaboration and
understanding of the nature of atoms. Ernest Rutherford, Wilhelm Rontgen, Henri
Poincare, Henri Becquerel, Marie Curie, Anton van den Broek, Alfred Mayer and
Henry Moseley all contributed empirical and theoretical insights that led of a deeper
understanding of atomic structure and its relation to the chemical and mathematical
properties of the known elements as well as the discovery of additional elements all
within the structure that the periodic table provided.
The availability of a micro theory that explained and predicted made the periodic
table available for reduction. That is, the chemical elements could be reinterpreted
in terms of a theoretic domain of objects based on the developing notions of the
atom and especially of the electron (Appendix, Part I, 2). Early accounts of the
elements in terms of electron configurations where constructed by Gilbert Lewis,
Irving Langmuir, Charles Bury and John Main Smith. That is to say, the micro
theory became reduction progressive (Appendix, Part I, 2.1). All of these early
efforts were the objects of contention and none was adequate to available empirical
evidence, but the power of the theoretic idea prevailed despite empirical difficulties
and despite the lack of a firm grounding in a clear theoretic account of the
underlying physics. This was to be changed by the seminal work of Neil Bohr and
Max Plank along with many others including most notably Wolfgang Pauli, which
led to quantum mechanics based on the matrix mathematics of Werner Heisenberg,
the empirical and theoretical work of Douglass Hartree and Vladimer Fock and the
essential work of Louis de Broglie, Erwin Schrodinger and Wolfgang Pauling. In
my terms the periodic table had become reduction chain progressive (Appendix,
Part I, 2 .2.). That is the elaboration of the underlying theory was itself becoming in
increasingly adequate both in terms of its empirical yield as reflected in better
measurements and in a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomena that it
reduced, that is, the chemical and mathematical properties identified in the Periodic
Table. And as always the theoretic advance was in the face of empirical difficulties.
At no time in the development of quantum theory was there an easy accommodation
between empirical fact and theoretic coherence. The various theories all worked
against anomalous facts and theoretic inconsistencies. And although this was the
subject of the ongoing debate the larger issue was driven by the coherence of the
project as evidenced by the increasing availability of partially adequate models and
intellectually satisfying accounts that initiated the enormous increase of chemical
knowledge that characterizes the last century.
The power of the periodic table was not fully displayed until the reduction to a
reasonably clear micro theory led to the enormous increase in breadth that
characterized the chemical explanations for the vast array of substances and
processes ranging from the electro-chemistry of the cell, to crystallography, from
transistors to cosmology. This is indicated in my model by the notion of a branching
reducer (Appendix, Part I, 2.3). It is simple fact, although seemingly hyperbolic, that

123

194

M. Weinstein

the entire mastery of the physical world evidenced by the breadth of practical
applications in modern times rests on the periodic table. That is quantum physics
through its application to the periodic table is a progressively branching reducer
(Appendix, Part I, 2.4).
But the scope of the periodic table, resting upon an increasingly elaborate
microphysics is still not the whole theory. For quantum mechanics itself has been
deepened with the increasingly profound theories of particle physics. This is an area
of deep theoretical and even philosophical contention and so it is possible, although
extremely unlikely, that the whole apparatus could collapse. But this would require
that a new and more adequate microphysics be invented that could replace the total
array of integrated physical science with an equally effective alternative. Such a
daunting prospect is what underlies my gloss on truth seen as the very best that we
can hope for.

Appendix
Part I:
1. A scientific structure, TT = ‹T,FF,RR› (physical chemistry is the paradigmatic
example) where T is a set of sentences that constitute the linguistic statement of TT
closed under some appropriate consequence relation and where FF is a set of
functions F, such that for each F in FF, there is a map f in F, such that f(T) = m, for
some model or near model of T. And where RR is a field of sets of representing
functions, R, such that for all R in RR and every r in R, there is some theory T* and
r represents T in T*, in respect of some subset of T.
A scientific structure is first of all, a set of nomic generalizations, the theoretic
commitments of the members of the field in respect of a given body of inquiry. We
then include distinguishable sets of possible models (or appropriately approximate
models) and a set of reducing theories (or near reducers). What we will be interested
in is a realization of TT, that is to say a triple ‹T,F,R› where F and R represent
choices from FF and RR, respectively. What we look at is the history of realizations,
that is an ordered n-tuple: ‹‹T,F1,R1›,…,‹T,Fn,Rn›› ordered in time. The claim is
that the adequacy of TT as a scientific structure is a complex function of the set of
realizations.
1.1. Let T0 be a subtheory of T in the sense that T0 is the restriction of the
relational symbols of T to some sub-set of these. Let f0 be subset of some f in F, in
some realization of TT. Let ‹T0 1,…,T0 n› be an ordered n-tuple such that for each i, j
(i \ j) T0 i reflects a subset of T modeled under some f0 at some time earlier than T0 j.
We say the T is model progressive under f0 iff:
(a) T0 k is identical to T for all indices k, or
(b) the ordered n-tuple ‹T0 1,…,T0 n› is well ordered in time by the subset relation.
That is to say, for each T0 i, T0 j in ‹T0 1,…T0 n› (i \ j C 2), if T0 i is earlier in
time than T0 j, T0 i is a proper subset of T0 j.
1.2. We define a model chain C, for theory, T, as an ordered n-tuple ‹m1,…,mn›,
such that for each mi in the chain mi = ‹di,fi,› for some domain di, and assignment
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function fi, and where for each di and dj in any mi, di = dj; and where for each i and
j (i \ j), mi is an earlier realization (in time) of T then mj.
Let M be an intended model of T, making sure that f(T) = M for some f in F (for
some realization ‹T,F,R›) and T is model progressive under f. We then say that C is
a progressive model chain iff:
(a) for every mi in C, mi is isomorphic to M, or
(b) there is an ordering of models in C such that for most pairs mi, mj (j [ i) in C,
mj is a nearer isomorph to M than mi.
This last condition is an idealization, as are all similar conditions that follow. We
cannot assume that all theoretic advances are progressive. Frequently, theories move
backwards without being, thereby, rejected. We are looking for a preponderance of
evidence or where possible, a statistic. Nor can we define this a priori. What counts
as an advance is a judgment in respect of a particular enterprise over time best made
pragmatically by members of the field.
1.3. Let ‹C1,…,Cn› be a well ordering of the progressive model chains of TT,
such that for all i, j (i [ j), Ci is a later model chain than Cj. TT is model chain
progressive iff ‹C1,…,Cn› is well ordered in time by the subset relation. That is
to say each later model includes and extends the models antecedent to it in
time.
2. We now turn out attention to the members of some R in RR. The members of
RR represent T in T* in respect of some subset of T, k(T). Let ‹k1(T),…,kn(T)› be
an n-tuple of representations of T over time, that is if i [ j, then ki(T) is a
representation of T in T* at a time later that kj(T). We say that TT is reduction
progressive iff,
(a) k(T) is identical to Con(T) for all indices, or
(b) the n-tuple is well ordered by the subset relation.
2.1. We call an n-tuple of theories RC = ‹T1,…,Tn› a reduction chain, and
‹T1,…,Tn› a deeper reduction chain than j-tuple ‹T0 1,…,T0 j›, iff n [ j and for all i, j
there is a ri in Ri such that ri represents Ti in Ti ? 1 and similarly for T0 i and further
for all Tk (k B j) Tk is identical in both chains Note, the index i must be different
from the index j, since if i = j, there is no Ti ? 1.
2.2. We call a theory reduction chain progressive iff T iff for an n-tuple of
reduction chains ‹RC1,…, RCn› and for each RCi (i \ 1), RCi ? 1 is a deeper
reduction chain than Rci.
2.3. T is a branching reducer iff there is a pair (at least) T0 and T* such that there
is some r0 and r* in R0 and R*, respectively, such that r0 represents T0 in T and r*
represents T* in T and neither T0 is represented in T* nor conversely.
2.3.1. B = ‹TT1,TT2,…,TTn› = ‹‹T1,F1,R1›, ‹T2,F2,R2›,…,‹Tn,Fn,Rn›› is a
reduction branch of TT1 iff T1 is a branching reducer in respect of Ti, and Tj
(i C 2; j C 3 for i, j B n)
2.4. We say that a branching reducer, T is a progressively branching reducer iff
the n-tuple of reduction branches ‹B1,…,Bn› is well ordered in time by the subset
relation, that is, for each pair i, j (i [ j) Bi is a later branch than Bj, that is, the
number of branching reducers has been increasing in breadth as inquiry persists.
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Part II:
The core construction is where a theory T is confronted with a counterexample, a
specific model of a data set inconsistent with T. The interesting case is where T has
prima facie credibility, that is, where T is at least model progressive, that is, is
increasingly confirmed over time (Part I, 1).
A. The basic notion is that a model, cm, is a confirming model of theory T in TT,
a model of data, of some experimental set-up or a set of systematic observations
interpreted in light of the prevailing theory that warrants the data being used. And
where
(1) cm. is either a model of T or
(2) cm is an approximation to a model of T and is the nth member of a sequence
of models ordered in time and T is model progressive (1.1).
B. A model interpretable in T, but not a confirming model of T is an anomalous
model.
The definitions of warrant strength from the previous section reflect a natural
hierarchy of theoretic embeddedness: model progressive, (1.1), model chain
progressive (1.3) reduction progressive (2), reduction chain progressive (2.2),
branching reducers (2.3) and progressively branching reducers (2.4). A/O opposition
varies with the strength of the theory. So, if T is merely model progressive, an
anomalous model is type-1 anomalous, if in addition, model chain progressive, type2 anomalous etc. up to type-6 anomalous for theories that are progressively
branching reducers.
P1: The strength of the anomaly is inversely proportional to dialectical
resistance, that is, counter-evidence afforded by an anomaly will be considered as
a refutation of T as a function of strength of T in relation to TT. In terms of
dialectical obligation, a claimant is dialectically responsible to account for type 1
anomalies or reject T and less so as the type of the anomalies increases.
P2: Strength of an anomaly is directly proportional to dialectical advantage, that
is, the anomalous evidence will be considered as refuting as a function of the power
of the explanatory structure within which it sits.
P*: The dialectical use of refutation is rational to the extent that it is an additive
function of P1 and P2.
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